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1 Introduction
The term "counterfactual" has a wide range of uses in philosophy, history, economics and statistics.
In philosophy counterfactual scenarios are often used in the analysis of causality, e.g. Lewis
(1973). Pearl (2009) provides an overview of the concepts and develops an analysis of causality
based on structural models. In history counterfactuals are posed by "what if" questions, such
as "what would the U.S. economy have been like in 1890 had there been no railroads?", Fogel
(1964). In economics alternative counterfactuals (hypothetical states of the world) are considered
in decision making under uncertainty. In statistics and econometrics counterfactuals are used in
policy evaluations (e.g. Heckman, 2008 & 2010). The above uses whilst quite distinct are closely
connected. However, in this paper we shall focus on the use of counterfactuals in ex post macro-
econometric policy evaluation, using the case of quantitative easing after March 2009 in the UK
as an example.
By a counterfactual we mean "what would have occurred if some observed characteristics or
aspects of the processes under consideration were di¤erent from those prevailing at the time."
For instance, what if the level of a policy variable, xt, is set di¤erently, or what if the parameters
of the process that determines xt are changed. In e¤ect, we are interested in comparing an
ex post realized outcome with a counterfactual outcome that could have obtained under certain
assumptions regarding the policy variable. Such an ex post policy counterfactual policy evaluation
exercise di¤ers from ex ante counterfactual analysis that contributes to the decision making leading
to adoption of a new policy, in a sense we make precise below.
In the analysis of policy evaluation it is important to distinguish between micro and macro
cases. In the former case policy is applied across many di¤erent units decomposed into those
a¤ected by policy (the "treated" group) and those that are not (the "untreated" group) within
a given time frame. This is the typical case in the microeconometric (micro) policy evaluation,
surveyed, for example, by Imbens & Wooldridge (2009). The other case is where the policy is
applied to a single or a few units but over two di¤erent time periods: a "policy o¤" and a "policy
on" period. This is the typical case in macroeconometric (macro) policy evaluation. The micro
policy evaluation problem has been the subject of a large literature, also known as the treatment
e¤ect literature. In contrast, there is less systematic methodological discussion of macro policy
evaluation. To be specic, suppose that we have units i = 1; 2; :::; N observed over time periods,
t = 1; 2; :::; T: In the micro analysis N tends to be large and T small, whereas in the macro
analysis N tends to be small and T large, including observations both before and after the policy
intervention.
In this paper we consider both the case of many units with a single time period and a single
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unit with many time periods, but focus on the methodological issues arising from the latter case of
an ex post macro policy evaluation exercise. We suppose that the counterfactuals being considered
can be generated from an explicit econometric model, such as a simultaneous equations model or a
rational expectations model, and emphasise the invariance assumptions required for the validity of
such counterfactual exercises. We show that it is important to distinguish between ad hoc policy
changes when policy instruments are shocked over one or more time periods, as compared to more
fundamental policy interventions where one or more parameters of a policy rule are changed.
Examples of macro counterfactuals are: what was the e¤ect of terrorism on the Basque country?
Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003); what would have happened to the economies of the UK and the
eurozone had the UK joined the euro in 1999? Pesaran, Smith & Smith (2007); what was the
e¤ect on growth in Hong Kong of political and economic integration with mainland China? Hsiao,
Ching & Wan (2011); what was the e¤ect of monetary shocks in the US? Angrist & Kuersteiner
(2011); what would have been the e¤ect of the Federal Reserve following a di¤erent policy rule?
Orphanides & Williams (2011); what was the e¤ect of Quantitative Easing in the UK? the case
discussed below.
In both microeconometrics and macroeconometrics there have been disputes about the im-
portance of structural modelling for policy evaluation. But what is meant by "structural" di¤ers
depending on the problem and context. The microeconometric issues are debated by Imbens
(2010) and Heckman (2010). In macroeconomics, structural models have been identied with
DSGE models, of a particular type, which have major limitations in addressing the policy ques-
tions that arose after the recent crisis.
We argue that for estimation of policy e¤ects we need to consider conditional models with
parameters that are invariant to policy change. A full structural specication is not always
necessary and di¤erent types of structures are needed for di¤erent purposes. A structural model
that helps identify a particular parameter of interest need not be appropriate for policy analysis
where the policy change could initiate direct and indirect impacts on outcomes.
Consider the e¤ects of a change in a policy (intervention) variable, xt, on a target or outcome
variable, yt. Suppose that yt and xt can also be a¤ected by a set of control variables, zt; which
need not be invariant to changes in xt: Finally, suppose that there exists a second set of variables,
wt, that could a¤ect yt or zt, but are known to be invariant to changes in xt. We argue that for
evaluation of the e¤ect of a policy change, we only need to consider a model of yt conditional on
xt and wt. There is no need for a structural model that involves all the four variable types.1 We
do not need to condition on zt but benet from conditioning on wt: In considering evaluation,
1This argument is closely related to what Heckman (2010, p.359) calls Marschaks maxim: that all that is
required to answer many policy questions are policy invariant combinations of the structural parameters rather
than the structural parameters themselves.
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we distinguish between policy changes that alter the parameters of the conditional model, as
compared to ad hoc policy changes that do not a¤ect the parameters of the reduced form policy
equations.
A simple example of travel mode choice may clarify the issues. Suppose that for a unit of
interest (such as an individual, rm or government) at time t we observe the setting of the policy
variable X = x0, (go by bus) and the outcome variable Y = y0, (bus travel time) and then at
time t + 1; we observe X = x1, (go by train) and Y = y1 (train travel time). We also observe
certain variables, wt, which are invariant to the decision about the indiviudals mode of travel.
These might include day of the week, weather on that day, or bus and train timetables. Then
for su¢ cient observations in each state and a given set of invariances, we can make probabilistic
statements about the values of Y in period t had the individual gone by train rather than by
bus. In practice we consider such counterfactuals all the time. When we consider them ex ante,
to make the decision whether to travel by bus or by train, we may not know the weather on the
day or other variables which inuence travel time on each mode. When we consider them ex post
we have a lot more information about realizations, such as the actual travel times on each mode
or the factors inuencing travel times. Ex post we can ask how long the travel time would have
been on the travel mode not chosen. In order to make this prediction we do not need to know all
factors a¤ecting journey time, those we do not know we treat as part of the random error. Clearly,
if we look at the weather forecast before deciding which mode of travel to take, the weather is
not invariant and should not be included in the control variates, wt. Prior information about the
context is crucial to specifying the counterfactual and the appropriate variables that are relevant
to the outcome but invariant to the policy choice.
We begin Section 2 with a consideration of the literature on treatment e¤ects that primarily
use the cross-sectional observations, to highlight the di¤erent issues that are involved in the
counterfactual analysis of a single unit over time as compared to the counterfactual analysis of
many cross section units over a given time interval. We then proceed to the time-series case of
counterfactual analysis for a single unit over time in Section 3.
We use the example of quantitative easing (QE) in the UK to illustrate our procedure in
Section 4. The estimates suggest that if QE in the UK after March 2009 caused a permanent 100
basis points reduction in the spread, in line with the estimate adopted by researchers at the Bank
of England, this would have an impact e¤ect on the growth rate of output of about one percentage
point. But this e¤ect is very quickly reversed with no permanent e¤ect on growth. Thus while
the change in the spread could have unintended permanent distributional e¤ects (between savers
and borrowers), the intended e¤ect of the policy on real output is likely to be temporary. Some
concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
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2 Counterfactual analysis across many units
Although it is not our primary focus, it is useful to consider the problem of counterfactual analysis
in a purely cross-sectional set up to highlight how it di¤ers from the time-series case which is our
focus. The cross-sectional studies assume that there are su¢ cient number of units that are subject
to the treatment and that the e¤ects of the treatment (if any) are fully materialized over the given
observation interval. It is also further assumed that there exists a su¢ cient number of units in
a control group who have not been subject to the treatment, but share common characteristics
with the treated. In contrast, in pure time series applications there are no control units and the
e¤ects of the treatment (policy) might be distributed over time and could be subject to reversal.
2.1 Identication of the treatment e¤ect using cross-sectional data
Suppose that a continuous target (or outcome) variable, yi; and a vector of exogenous covariates,
wi; are observed for a sample of i = 1; 2; :::; N units (individuals) in a given time period, and there
is a discrete policy treatment denoted by a dummy variable xi that takes the value of unity if
individual i is treated, and zero for the untreated. Denote the outcomes for the treated individuals
by yTiT ; iT = 1; 2; :::; NT ; and for the untreated ones by y
U
iU ; iU = 1; 2; :::; NU , so that N = NT +NU :
We distinguish the index, iT or iU ; to emphasise that we are considering the observed outcomes
for di¤erent units not the actual and counterfactual outcomes for the same unit. To estimate the
e¤ect of treatment, we require observations on both treated and untreated. If the proportion
treated is p = NT =N we require that 0 < p < 1; or more generally if p(wi) = p(xi = 1 j wi) is the
probability of treatment conditional on covariates, we require 0 < p(wi) < 1: This assumption
ensures that for each value of wi there are both treated and untreated units. Given data on xi
and wi; the propensity score p(wi) can be estimated.
We provide a formulation that relates easily to the time-series case and for simplicity as-
sume a single covariate, but allow the parameters to be randomly heterogeneous and distributed
independently of the covariate.2 Specically, we assume that
yTiT = 
T
iT + iT + 
T
iT w
T
iT + "
T
iT ; "
T
iT  IID(0; 2T ); iT = 1; 2; :::; NT ;
yUiU = 
U
iU + 
U
iUw
U
iU + "
U
iU ; "
U
iU  IID(0; 2U ); iU = 1; 2; :::; NU ;
iT =  + viT ; viT  IID(0; 2v);
TiT = 
T + TiT ; 
T
iT  IID(0; 2T ;); UiU = U + UiU ; iU  IID(0; 2U ;);
TiT = 
T + TiT ; 
T
iT  IID(0; 2T ;); UiU = U + UiU ; UiU  IID(0; 2U ;):
2Hsiao, Li, Liang & Xie (2011) consider the case of correlated random coe¢ cient models.
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Using xi = 1 for the treated units and xi = 0 for the untreated, the model can be written
compactly as
yi = 
U + (T   U + )xi + T (wTi xi) + U

wUi (1  xi)

+ ui; (1)
where
ui = xi(vi + 
T
i + 
T
i w
T
i + "
T
i ) + (1  xi)(Ui + Ui wUi + "Ui ):
It is clear that the treatment e¤ect, ; can only be identied if T = U = ; namely that if
there are no systematic di¤erences between the two groups apart from the treatment. Under this
condition, we have
yi = + xi + iwi + ui; (2)
where i = T and wi = wTi if xi = 1, and i = 
U and wi = wUi , if xi = 0.
Then, noting that xi(1 xi) = 0; necessary conditions for identication of  in the cross-section
model (1) are: 0 < p < 1, T = U and
E

xi
 
vi + 
T
i + 
T
i w
T
i + "
T
i

= 0;
E

xiw
T
i
 
vi + 
T
i + 
T
i w
T
i + "
T
i

= 0;
E

(1  xi)wUi
 
Ui + 
U
i w
U
i + "
U
i

= 0:
The above assumptions require that treatment, xi = 1; should not be correlated with charac-
teristics of the treated or the covariates, and that for the treated the covariates are not correlated
with the characteristics of the treated. The assumptions could fail if the assignment or selection
into the treatment or non-treatment groups was on the basis of the individual component of the
treatment e¤ect, vi; or their intercept, Ti . The correlation of xi with vi or 
T
i has been a major
focus of the microeconometric literature.
If T = U = ; and T and U are homogenous, we can write (1)
yi = + xi + 
T (wTi xi) + 
U wUi (1  xi)+ ui (3)
Dene wT = N 1T
PNT
iT =1w
T
iT , wU = N
 1
U
PNU
iU=1w
U
iU , s
2
T = N
 1
T
PNT
iT =1(w
T
iT   wT )2, and s2U =
N 1U
PNU
iU=1(w
U
iU   wU )2.
Assuming that 0 < p < 1 then s2U = N
 1
U
PNU
iU=1(w
U
iU   wU )2 > 0; and s2T = N 1T
PNT
iT =1(w
T
iT  
wT )2 > 0, and the least squares estimate of  in (3) is given by
^ =
 
yT   bT wT    yU   bU wU = baT   baU ;
bT is the estimated regression coe¢ cient on the treated sample and bU is the regression coe¢ cient
on the untreated sample. The estimate of ^ is the di¤erence between the estimated intercepts
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from the two separate OLS regressions for the treated and the untreated. This brings out the role
of the identifying assumption, T = U , which enables us to test if the e¤ect of the treatment is
statistically signicant.
3 Counterfactual analysis for a single unit over time
3.1 A rational expectations framework
We now consider a policy evaluation problem where the aim is to estimate the "average" e¤ect of
a policy intervention, given time-series data for a single unit for both "policy o¤" and "policy on"
periods. Given that we are considering a single unit and the objective is to measure the e¤ect of
the intervention on that unit, the selection problem discussed above will not arise.
We begin by abstracting from model and parameter estimation uncertainty, these are impor-
tant in practice but are not specic to the issues of counterfactuals. We do, however, allow for the
possibility that the policy intervention might change some of the model parameters in the context
of a rational expectations model. We suppose that the single target or outcome variable yt is af-
fected directly by a single policy variable xt and one or more control variates, zt. We also assume
that there exists a set of variables, wt, that a¤ect yt or zt but are invariant to changes in xt and
zt. Obvious examples of wt are international oil prices or world output for policy interventions
in the case of a small open economy such as the UK.3 As our example of travel mode choice in
the introduction illustrated the choice of the elements of wt will depend on the context. In that
example the choice by the individual to go by bus or train in unlikely to change the travel time of
the bus or train, since the individual is viewed as being one amongst many that make the same
travel choices. It is also implicitly assumed that such individual decisions are cross-sectionally
independent.
As noted earlier, it is important that we distinguish the cases where there is an exogenous,
ad hoc, change in xt from the case where there is a change in the process determining xt: Let
qt = (yt; z
0
t)
0, st = (xt;w0t)0, and suppose that the endogenous variables, qt, are determined by
the following rational expectations model
A0qt = A1Et(qt+1) + A2st + ut; (4)
where Et(qt+1) = E(qt+1 j It); and It is the non-decreasing information set, It = (qt; st; qt 1; st 1; ::::).
The processes generating the elements of st are given by
xt = xxt 1 + vxt, and wt = Rwwt 1 + vwt
3We assume that there are a small number of variables in the vector wt: It there are a large number, the
dimension could be restricted by Bayesian shrinkage or extracting principal components.
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so that wt is invariant to changes in xt and qt: The errors, ut and vt have means zero, constant
variances, and E(utv0t) = 0. The RE model could result from some well dened decision problem,
and can be extended to allow for dynamics. But it is su¢ ciently general for our purposes.
We assume that apart from possible changes in the process determining xt; that is changes
in x; the model is stable in that the structural parameters (A0; A1; A2) are policy and time
invariant. We will also require that certain parameters, such as  = (x; vec(Rw)
0)0, are identied.
There is a unique stationary solution if all the eigenvalues ofQ = A 10 A1 lie within the unit circle.
The unique solution is given by
A0qt = G(;a)st + ut; (5)
where a = vec(A0;A1;A2),
V ec(G) =

(I
 I)   R0
A1A 10  1 V ec (A2) ;
and R is dened by st = Rst 1 + vst:
Equation (5) is the structural form of a standard simultaneous equations model. Assume that
there are su¢ cient identifying restrictions to consistently estimate the unknown elements of the
structural parameters, A0; A1; and A2. If the process determining policy changes, through a
change in x, the parameters in G will not be invariant to the policy change. But if the change in
policy is in the form of changes in the values of xt achieved by shocking vxt, the policy change does
not cause a change in the parameters and the e¤ect of the policy intervention can be computed
using the reduced form equation
qt = A
 1
0 G(;a)st + A
 1
0 ut = st + vt: (6)
Therefore, for the analysis of ad hoc changes in the policy variable knowledge of structural para-
meters is not necessary, and the analysis can be based on the policy reduced form equation which
for yt is given by
yt = 1xt + 
0
2wt + vyt: (7)
Suppose that a policy intervention is announced at the end of period T for the periods T +
1; T + 2; :::; T + H. The intervention is such that the "policy on" realized values of the policy
variable are di¤erent from the "policy o¤" counterfactual which would have happened in the
absence of the intervention. Dene, the information set available at time t as 
T = fyt; xt; zt; wt
for t = T; T   1; T   2; ::::g: The realized policy values are: 	T+h(x) = fxT+1; xT+2; :::; xT+hg:
The counterfactual policy values are: 	T+h(x0) = fx0T+1; x0T+2; :::; x0T+hg:
Ex ante policy evaluation is relatively straightforward and can be carried out by comparing
the e¤ects of two alternative sets of policy values, say 	T+h(x0) and 	T+h(x1), or 	0T+h and
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	1T+h, for short. Notice that the expected sequence with "policy on" 	
1
T+h will di¤er from the
realized sequence 	T+h; by implementation errors. The expected e¤ects of "policy on" 	T+h(x1)
relative to "policy o¤" 	T+h(x0) is given by
dT+h = E(yT+h j 
T ;	1T+h)  E(yT+h j 
T ;	0T+h); h = 1; 2; :::;H
The evaluation of these expectations critically depends on the type of invariances assumed. These
invariances would include whether the announced policy is credible, and whether the parameters
would change.
In the context of the above stylized model, the e¤ects of ad hoc changes in the policy variable
are given by
E(yT+h j 
T ;	0T+h) = E
 
1
	0T+h x0T+h + 02E  wT+h 	0T+h  , for h = 1; 2; :::;H:
The policy reduced form equation, (7), is clearly mis-specied if the objective is to estimate the
structural parameters. But for the counterfactual analysis, it is the total e¤ect of the policy
change which is needed, and this parameter is consistently estimated by the regression of y on x
and w.
Under the assumption that wt, the policy reduced form parameters (1 and 2 ), and the
errors, vyt, are invariant to policy interventions we have the simple result that for h = 1; 2; ::: the
e¤ect of policy is:
dT+h = 1
 
x1T+h   x0T+h

: (8)
It is clear that this result does not require the invariance of the structural parameters, but only
that the policy reduced form parameters are invariant to policy intervention.
In cases where wt and vyt are invariant to the policy change but the parameters are not
(possibly due to expectational e¤ects as in (6) ) we have
dT+h = E
 
1
	1T+h x1T+h   E  1 	0T+h x0T+h
+

E
 
2
	1T+h   E  2 	0T+h wT+h
The parameters are treated as random variables since they may be changed by policy. In practice,
the potential e¤ects of policy change on the parameters must also be modelled. In the case of the
rational expectations models the dependence of 1 and 2 on the policy parameters can be used
to compute the expressions E
 
1
	1T+h , E  1 	0T+h , and E  2 	1T+h   E  2 	0T+h .
There are a number of advantages in basing the policy analysis directly on the policy reduced
form equation (7). Using a full structural model for policy evaluation requires that all parameters
are invariant to the policy intervention, but there may be circumstances, where the total e¤ect is
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more likely to be invariant to the intervention than the marginal e¤ects captured by the structural
parameters. A policy reduced form equation of the type discussed above is likely to be more robust
to the invariance assumption than a fully structural model. There may also be cases where it is
more e¢ cient to estimate the total e¤ect directly, rather than indirectly from the full structural
model. Estimating the full system of equations may be more sensitive to specication errors, as
compared to the policy reduced form equation.
3.2 Allowing for dynamics
While equation (7) is a static model, the above analysis can be extended to dynamic models, with
the di¤erence that the counterfactual has to be computed recursively from the policy date, T ,
onward. When dynamic e¤ects are included in the RE model, (4), the solution can be written
as a general autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in yt,xt and wt, (after solving out the
e¤ects of zt)
yt = (L)yt 1 + 1(L)xt + 02(L)wt + vyt; for t = 1; 2; :::; T; T + 1; :::; T +H
where
(L) = 1L+ 2L
2 + :::+ pL
p; and j(L) = aj0 + aj1L+ ::::+ ajqjL
qj , j = 1; 2:
As before 
T = fyt; xt; zt; wt for t = T; T   1; T   2; ::::g, and two policy counterfactuals are
	0T+h = fx0T+1; x0T+2; :::; x0T+hg, and 	1T+h = fx1T+1; x1T+2; :::; x1T+hg: To illustrate how dT+h can
be derived in this case we consider the following simple specication
yt = yt 1 + 10xt + 11xt 1 + 02wt + vyt; for t = 1; 2; :::; T; T + 1; :::; T +H (9)
and note that
yT+h = 10
1X
j=0
jxT+h j + 11
1X
j=0
jxT+h 1 j + 02
1X
j=0
jwT+h j +
1X
j=0
jvy;T+h j ;
Evaluating the e¤ect of policy conditional on 
T gives
dT+h = 10
h 1X
j=0
j(x1T+h j   x0T+h j) + 11
hX
j=1
j 1(x1T+h j   x0T+h j)+
h 1X
j=0
02
j

E
 
wT+h j

T ;	1h   E  wT+h j 
T ;	0h +
h 1X
j=0
j

E
 
vy;T+h j

T ;	1h   E  vy;T+h j 
T ;	0h  :
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Since, wt is invariant to the policy change we have
dT+h = 10
h 1X
j=0
j(x1T+h j   x0T+h j) + 11
hX
j=1
j 1(x1T+h j   x0T+h j); (10)
which is a direct generalization of the static formulation.
The unknown parameters in the policy e¤ects, dT+h, can be computed using the policy reduced
form equation. Assuming T is large, the parameters can be estimated either from the sample before
the intervention, t = 1; 2; :::T or from the whole sample available, t = 1; 2; :::T +H: We also need
to consider the possible endogeneity of xt: Suppose that the policy variable xt is generated by
xt = b1(L)xt 1 + b2(L)yt 1 + vxt
bj(L) = bj0 + bj1L+ ::::+ bjsjL
sj :
with vyt and vxt being correlated. To correct for the endogeneity, following Pesaran & Shin
(1999), we model the contemporaneous correlation between vyt and vxt; by vyt = vxt + t, where
by construction vxt and t are uncorrelated The parametric correction for the endogenous xt is
equivalent to augmenting the ARDL specication with an adequate number of lagged changes in
xt before estimation of the policy reduced form equation is carried out.
3.3 A test for policy e¤ectiveness
In many cases we will want to make statements about the probability of policy being e¤ective or
test the hypothesis that the policy had no e¤ect, we now consider this issue. Returning to the
simple static specication, we noted above that the ex ante estimate of the e¤ect of policy would
be
d
(ex ante)
T+h = 1
 
x1T+h   x0T+h

: (11)
However, ex post the realizations of policy variable might not coincide with the planned or intended
values of x, and we would have
E (yT+h j
T ;	T+h; wT+1; wT+2; :::; wT+h )  E
 
yT+h

T ;	0T+h; wT+1; wT+2; :::; wT+h 
= 1
 
xT+h   x0T+h

(12)
where 	1T+h and x
1
T+h; the expected values of the policy variable given information at time t,
may di¤er from the realisations 	T+h and xT+h; because of implementation errors.
We can also calculate the di¤erence between the realized values of the outcome variable in the
"policy on" period with the counterfactual for the outcome variable with "policy o¤":
d
(ex post)
T+h = yT+h   E
 
yT+h

T ;	0T+h; wT+1; wT+2; :::; wT+h 
= 1(xT+h   x0T+h) + vy;T+h: (13)
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Unlike the ex ante measure of the policy e¤ects, the ex post measure given above depends on the
value of the realized shock, vy;T+h, and the statistical analysis of the e¤ectiveness of the policy
require relatively large post policy samples so that the inuence of the random component can
be minimized.
The ex post mean e¤ect of the policy is given by
dH =
1
H
HP
h=1
(xT+h   x0T+h) +
1
H
HP
h=1
vy;T+h:
One could develop a test of dH = 0, using an estimator of 1; b1 for T and H su¢ ciently large.
In the case where H=T ! 0 as T !1, a test of the policy e¤ectiveness hypothesis can be based
on bdH = ^1  1
H
HP
h=1
(xT+h   x0T+h)

where H 1
HP
h=1
(xT+h   x0T+h) is a measure of the average size of the policy change. The policy-
e¤ectiveness test statistic can now be written as
PH =
bdH
^vy
as N(0; 1); (14)
where ^vy is the standard error of the policy reduced form regression.
4 Unconventional monetary policy: an empirical application
We will illustrate the proposed approach to single-unit counterfactual analysis with a consideration
of the e¤ect of unconventional monetary policies, UMP, such as quantitative easing, QE. In
practice, UMP have tended to be adopted when central banks have hit the zero lower bound for
the policy interest rate, but in principle they could be adopted even interest rates are not at the
lower bound. The term quantitative easing was used by the Bank of Japan to describe its policies
from 2001, Bowman et al. (2011). During the nancial crisis, starting in 2007, and particularly
after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 many central banks adopted UMP. The central
banks di¤ered in the specic measures used and had di¤erent theoretical perceptions of what the
policy interventions were designed to achieve and the transmission mechanisms involved.4 Borio
and Disyatat (2010) classify such policies as balance sheet policies, as distinct from interest rate
policies, and describe the variety of di¤erent types of measures adopted by seven central banks
during the nancial crisis.
In the UK QE involved exchanging one liability of the state - government bonds (gilts) - for
another - claims on the central bank. That change in the quantities of the two assets would cause
4For instance Giannone et al. (2011), who discuss the euro area, distinguish the Eurosystems actions from the
QE adopted by other Central Banks.
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a rise in the price of guilts, decline in their yields, but also cause a rise in the prices of substitute
assets such as corporate bonds and equities. The Bank of England believed5 that QE boosts
demand by increasing wealth and by reducing companiescost of nance. It also increases banks
liquidity and may prompt more lending. Event studies documented in Joyce et al. (2011) suggest
that QE reduced the spread of long over short term government interest rates (the spread) by
100 basis points from its introduction in March 2009. Thus the counterfactual we consider is the
e¤ect of a 100 basis points reduction in the spread, xt; on output growth, yt: Notice that this is
what we called above an ad hoc intervention changing the level of the policy variable, as distinct
from an intervention changing the parameters of a policy rule.
The data is taken from the Global VAR dataset, recently extended to 2011Q2.6 Growth, yt;
is measured by the quarterly change in the logarithm of real GDP. In calculating the spread, the
short and long interest rates are expressed as 0:25 log(1 +R=100); where R is the annual percent
rate. Figure 1 plots UK output growth and the spread over the full sample period 1979Q2-2011Q2.
The estimate that QE reduced the spread by 100 basis points is not uncontroversial, Meaning
and Zhu (2011) estimate a smaller impact of about 25 basis points, but our estimates could be
easily scaled downwards to match this alternative estimate. Kapetanios et al (2012), who examine
the e¤ects of QE on UK output growth and ination, also use a reduction in spread of 100 basis
points. In their analysis they are particularly concerned about structural change and use three
time-varying VAR models that allow for the parameter change in di¤erent ways, but do not
consider the possible e¤ects of QE on other zt type variables. Baumeister and Benati (2010) also
use time varying VARs to assess the macroeconomic e¤ects of QE in the US and UK, assuming
the e¤ect of QE in the UK was to reduce the spread by 50 basis points. But as our theoretical
analysis highlights, the e¤ects of structural breaks due to factors other than the policy change
must be distinguished from the structural breaks that could result from the policy intervention.
These studies are concerned with past parameter variations and implicitly assume that the policy
intervention has no independent e¤ects on parameter values.
Here we re-examine the e¤ects of QE on UK output growth, and for reasons explained in
the theoretical part of the paper we shall be using the policy reduced form approach rather than
a full structural model. Like Kapetanios et al. (2012) we assume that QE caused a 100 basis
points reduction in the spread.7 We do not rule out that QE might have had an impact on other
variables, such as zt, with indirect e¤ects on output growth. But we recall that such zt-e¤ects are
solved out and are indirectly accommodated in our approach.
5For instance see the Financial Times article 4 May 2012 by Charlie Bean, the Banks Deputy Governor.
6Described in Dees et al. (2007), with updates available at www-
cfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/gvartoolbox/index.html.G
7 It is assumed that the reduction in spreads is permanent. But other time proles for the policy e¤ects of QE
on spreads could also be considered.
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As for the choice of the conditioning variables, wt, we use foreign output variables as they
are unlikely to have been signicantly a¤ected by UK QE, but their inclusion allows for the
possible indirect e¤ects of unconventional monetary policies implemented in US and euro area on
UK output growth. Figure 2 plots UK and US output growths, Figure 3, UK and euro output
growths. Like Kapetanios et al. (2012) we assume that the reduction in the spread is permanent.
But other time proles for the policy e¤ects of QE on spreads could also be considered. Again
such modications can be readily accommodate within our framework.
We rst use a bivariate ARDL in output growth (yt) and the spread between long and short
interest rates (xt). Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that ARDL estimates are robust to endogeneity
and robust to the fact that yt (stationary) and xt (near unit root) have di¤erent degrees of
persistence. The bivariate ARDL may be more robust to structural change, than models with
a large number of variables and may reduce forecast uncertainty due to estimation error. The
ARDL is also preferable to VAR models for counterfactual analysis since it allows e¢ ciency gains
by conditioning on contemporaneous policy variables.
A bivariate ARDL model with lag orders automatically selected by AIC (or SBC), gives model
M1:
yt = + yt 1 + 10xt + 11xt 1 + vyt:
We consider two samples, both starting in 1980Q3, one ending estimation in 2008Q4, the last data
available before QE, the other ending estimation in 2011Q2.8 With structural instability there is
an issue of whether the variance or the mean shifts. When error variances are falling, as occurred
during the period before the nancial crisis (the so-called great moderation), it is optimal to place
more weights on the most recent observations. Pesaran, Pick and Pranovich (2011).
Both model M1 equations pass tests for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, fail (at the
5% level) tests for normality and functional form. The equation estimated up to 2008Q4, passes
predictive failure and parameter stability tests. In all the specications, it is the change in spread
that seems important. The impact of the policy tends to erode quite rapidly (within less than
a year) with the long-run e¤ect of the spread on output growth not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. This is apparent from Figure 4, where the model M1 predictions for growth using realised
and counterfactual spread converge quite quickly. A similar picture also emerges from Charts 2
and 3 of Kapetanios et al. (2012) where the 100 basis point counterfactual returns to the model
prediction within about a year , although they do not highlight this aspect of their results. Notice
that as is clear from a comparison of (11) and (13), our distinction between ex ante and ex post
evaluation is not based on the sample used for estimation, but on whether the counter-factual
8The estimates tend to be quite sensitive to sample, giving larger e¤ects if shorter sample periods including the
crisis are considered.
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predictions are compared with predicted (ex ante) or realized (ex post) values of the policy and
outcome variables. On this basis Kapetanios et al. conduct an ex ante evaluation exercise.9 The
issues of parameter and model uncertainty, and the choice of the estimation sample (whether to
include post intervention observations in the sample) will be present irrespective of whether the
policy evaluation exercise is carried out ex post or ex ante.
Model M1: ARDL in UK output growth (yt) and spread (xt)
1980Q3-2008Q4 1980Q3-2011Q2
yt 1 0.3986 0.4773
(4.75) (6.69)
xt -0.9139 -1.0073
(-2.83) (-3.08)
xt 1 1.1571 1.1269
(3.54) (3.44)
R
2
0.290 0.363
LM test Res. Serial corr. 0.747 0.651bvy 0.0053 0.0053
Bracketed gures are t-ratios
We can improve the e¢ ciency of estimation by conditioning on foreign output growth variables.
Over the full sample the correlation between UK growth and US growth is 0.47, in the post 1999
sample it is 0.76. For euro growth, the correlations are 0.36 and 0.73. Thus we augment the ARDL
with current euro and US growth rates. In terms of the earlier notation wt = (yUSt ; y
Euro
t )
0. The
estimated equation is model M2:
yt = + yt 1 + 10xt + 11xt 1 + usyUSt + euroy
Euro
t + vyt:
The t is rather better than the bivariate ARDL and again the equations pass tests for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity, fail (at the 5% level) tests for normality and functional form.
The equation estimated up to 2008Q4, passes predictive failure and parameter stability tests. We
cannot reject 10 + 11 = 0 on the full sample. This restriction is imposed in the simulations
reported below. Although the long-run e¤ect is very close to zero in both models, the impact
e¤ect is rather smaller when one allows for foreign growth, 0.77-0.82 in model M2, depending
on the sample used; which is less than the 0.91-1.0 e¤ect in model M1 which does not allow for
the foreign output variables. This di¤erence is understandable considering that the UK economy
would have beneted from growth in the US and euro area even if the Bank of England had not
adopted QE.
9Kapetanios et al. (2012,p22) comment "..these are estimated by comparing the no policy scenario with the
policy scenario which is a forecast conditional on the actual path for Bank Rate over the forecast horizon. The
e¤ects would be larger if the counterfactual were dened as the no policy scenario relative to the actual data, as
the model underpredicts output and ination over the period."
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Model M2: ARDL in UK growth (y) and spread (x) augmented with US and Euro area growth
rates
1980Q3-2008Q4 1980Q3-2011Q2
yt 1 0.3217 0.3822
(3.71) (5.12)
xt -0.7693 -0.8197
(-2.47) (-2.63)
xt 1 1.1116 1.0092
(3.58) (3.29)
yUSt 0.1349 0.1465
(1.83) (2.00)
yEurot 0.1546 0.1636
(2.58) (3.047)
R
2
0.362 0.446
LM test Res. Serial Corr. 0.721 0.332bvy 0.0050 0.0050
Bracketed gures are t-ratios
Figures 4-7 examine the e¤ect of a 100 basis points increase in spreads on growth, imposing
the restriction that the long-run e¤ect is zero. We have two models (M1: bivariate ARDL and
M2: ARDL conditional on US and euro area output growth) and two estimation samples: ending
in 2008Q4 or 2011Q2. The choice of the estimation sample does not make much of a di¤erence.
Figure 4 compares the predictions for output growth using realized and counterfactual spreads
based on model M1, the bivariate ARDL. Figure 5 compares the predictions for output growth
using realized and counterfactual spreads based on model M2, the ARDL model that includes US
and euro output growth. Figure 6 compares the counterfactual forecasts using the two models,
M1 and M2, with and without foreign output growth. Figure 7 also includes the actual UK
output growth rate. Conditional on US and euro growth rates the impact e¤ect of QE is a little
smaller. Overall, a 100 basis points increase in spreads reduces growth by somewhat less than
1% on impact, but while the e¤ect on the spread is assumed permanent, the e¤ect on growth is
temporary and gets reversed quite quickly.
We also considered the application of the policy ine¤ectiveness test statistic given by (14) to
the current problem, but due to the rapid reversal of the policy e¤ects we found the test not to be
statistically signicant, suggesting that the average e¤ect of the policy computed even over a 2-3
years time horizon will be zero. This is compatible with the policy having a statistically signicant
impact e¤ect without the average policy e¤ect being statistically signicant if computed over a
longer time period.
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5 Conclusion
For evaluation of treatments or policy interventions structural identication is not required. What
is needed is identication of the parameters of the policy equation where the e¤ects of the co-
variates that are inuenced by the policy are solved out. Strong parameter and error invariance
assumptions are also needed. We distinguish between ex ante evaluation, which uses predicted
policy and outcomes, and ex post evaluation, which uses realizations of policy and outcomes,
and highlight the importance of conditioning on the variables that explain the outcomes but are
invariant to policy interventions. We also consider the di¤erences between the micro treatment
literature and the time series policy evaluation exercises. Although we do not discuss it, the
approach adopted here naturally extends to panel data where one has time series for a number
of units some of whom are subject to the policy intervention, with all the units observed both
before and after the policy intervention.
We illustrate some of the issues that arise in counterfactual policy evaluation with an empirical
application to Quantitative Easing which was introduced in the UK in March 2009. The UK QE
involved exchanging one liability of the state - government bonds (gilts) - for another - claims on
the central bank. That change in the quantities of the two assets would cause a rise in the price
of guilts, decline in their yields, but also cause a rise in the prices of substitute assets such as
corporate bonds and equities. We estimate two models explaining UK output growth over two
sample periods, one ending in 2008Q4 (before QE), and the other ending in 2011Q2. Model M1
is a bivariate dynamic equation between growth and the spread of long interest rates over short
interest rates, model M2 adds US and euro area output growth to model M1.
Although there is some dispute about the size of the e¤ect of QE on interest rate spreads, we
follow the Bank of England in assuming that QE caused a permanent 100 basis points reduction
in the spread of long interest rates over short interest rates after March 2009. Both models and
both sample periods indicate that it is the change in spread that matters: there is a signicant
impact e¤ect of QE but this e¤ect tends to disappear quite quickly, certainly within a year. In
all cases the long-run e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Although the long-run e¤ect
of the change in the spread on output growth is not emphasized by Kapetanios et al. (2012), the
estimates they provide for the time proles of the e¤ects of the QE tell very much the same story,
namely the benecial e¤ects of QE are rather short-lived. The size of the impact e¤ect of the
100 basis points reduction in the spread on the output growth rate is between three quarters of a
percentage point and one percentage point, with the lower estimate coming from the model that
includes foreign output growth. Thus while the estimated change in the spread caused by QE, if
sustained, would have permanent distributional e¤ects between savers and borrowers, the change
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in spread only generated a temporary stimulus to growth. This raises a number of policy issues.
These include the costs and benets of a permanent change in spread relative to a temporary
stimulus to growth, the optimal timing for a temporary stimulus and the e¤ects of the eventual
reversal of QE.
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Figure 1
UK (blue) and US (red) Output Growths 
 Corr(UK,US) = 0.47 (full sample), 0.76 (post 1999) 
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Figure 2
UK (blue) and Euro (red) Output Growths 
Corr(UK,Euro)= 0.36 (full sample), 0.73 (post 1999) 
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Figure 3
UK Output Growth Forecasts using Realized (blue) and 
Counterfactual (red) Spreads – Model 1 without US and 
Euro Output Growths 
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Figure 4
UK Output Growth Forecasts using Realized (blue) and 
Counterfactual (red) Spreads – Model 2 with US and 
Euro Output Growths 
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Figure 5
Counterfactual Output Growths based on Models 
without (blue) and with (red) US and Euro Output 
Growths  
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Figure 6
Realized (Blue) and Counterfactual UK Output 
Growths (Models M1 and M2) 
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